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ABSTRACT 
The aim of Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE), as Ess aptly 
puts, is to “(a) address both local and global issues evoked by 
ICTs / CMC, etc., (b) in a ways that both sustain local traditions 
/ values / preference, etc. and (c) provide shared, (quasi-) 
universal responses to central ethical problems” (Ess 2007a, 
102). This formulation of the aim of IIE, however, is not 
unambiguous.  In this paper, I will discuss two different 
understandings of the aim of IIE, one of which advocates 
“shared norms, different interpretations” and another proposes 
“shared norms, different justifications”. I shall argue that the 
first understanding is untenable, and the second understanding is 
acceptable only with qualification. Finally, I shall briefly 
suggest an alternative way to understand the aim of IIE. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an increasingly globalizing world, Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) are becoming an 
important part of the daily life for not only Western but 
also non-Western peoples. Ethical issues in relation to 
ICTs are therefore increasingly becoming global ethical 
issues.  Ideally, one would like to have a set of (quasi-) 
universal responses to handle ethical problems related to 
ICTs in global and cross-cultural contexts. But is this 
possible?  As some scholars have rightly pointed out 
(Brey 2007a; Capurro 2008; Ess 2005, 2006, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008; Ess & Hongladarom 2007), current debates 
and discussions in information ethics are dominated by 
the ethical frameworks that are distinct from those in non-
Western cultures, whose ethical frameworks may not be 
immediately compatible. For example, the arguments for 
the protection of privacy is often based on the individual's 
autonomy; these arguments may sound peculiar for 
Confucian cultures, which generally weigh the collective, 
common good over and above the benefit of individuals. 
 
Being aware of the importance of cultural diversity and 
the vices of ethical imperialism, these scholars have 
called for careful investigations of moral systems in 
different cultures, when dealing with intercultural or 
cross-cultural ethical issues related to ICTs. As such, the 
aim of Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE), as Ess aptly 
puts, is to “(a) address both local and global issues 
evoked by ICTs / CMC, etc., (b) in a ways that both 
sustain local traditions / values / preference, etc. and (c) 
provide shared, (quasi-) universal responses to central 
ethical problems” (Ess 2007a, 102). This formulation of 
the aim of IIE, however, is not unambiguous. 
Particularly, it is unclear as to what exactly does “sustain 
local traditions / values / preference, etc.” refers to; as 
well as, what “shared, (quasi-) universal responses” 
means. In this paper, I will offer two possible 
understandings of the aim of IIE as characterized by Ess; 
namely, one that advocates (i) ‘shared norms, different 
interpretations’ and one that proposes (ii) ‘shared norms, 
different justifications’. I shall argue that (i) is untenable, 
and (ii) is acceptable only with qualifications. In doing 
so, I hope to illustrate the inadequacy of the prevailing 
understandings of the aim of IIE. To overcome the 
inadequacy, I shall briefly suggest an alternative way to 
understand the aim of IIE in the final section. 
INTERCULTURAL INFORMATION ETHICS AS A 
NORMATIVE PROJECT  
Before explaining the two understandings of the aim of 
IIE, it is worth identifying the basic requirements for an 
adequate framework for IIE. Already pointed out by Brey 
(2007a) and Himma (2008), two distinct stages of IIE 
can, and should, be distinguished. These two stages are 
respectively, the descriptive analysis of different moral 
systems in various cultures and the normative analysis of 
these moral systems and the related task of formulating 
(quasi-) universal moral principles in response to ICTs-
related ethical issues. As it is clear in Ess's formulation of 
the aim of IIE, both descriptive analysis and normative 
analysis are essential components of an adequate 
framework for IIE. 
 
As IIE aims to provide responses to ICTs-related ethical 
issues which are (quasi-) acceptable from various cultural 
perspectives, what is considered to be acceptable in the 
moral systems of these cultures must first be identified; 
thus, the first stage of IIE will involve tasks such as 
explicating the actual moral norms and/or moral values 
embedded in these cultures, studying the impacts of ICTs 
to these cultures and their reactions towards ICTs. The 
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 empirical findings, then will provide the basis for 
formulating the (quasi-) universal moral principles; thus, 
descriptive analysis of moral systems is indispensable in 
any adequate framework of IIE. 
 
However, equally important for an adequate framework 
for IIE is the possibility to derive normative and 
evaluative judgments from the framework; as IIE does 
not only aim to describe the actual responses to the ICT-
related ethical issues from a specific cultural perspective, 
it also attempts to provide “shared, (quasi-) universal 
responses to central ethical problems”. In other words, 
IIE is prescriptive insofar as it tells us how one ought to 
respond to the intercultural or cross-cultural ICTs-
related ethical problems; and, for such responses to be 
meaningful, they have to be normative, minimally, in the 
sense that if party A fails to respond as specified (or, if A 
fails to comply to the normative, moral standard 
underlying the responses), the other parties can 
legitimately condemn A's failure to do so. 
 
Since IIE aims to investigate the ICTs-related ethical 
problems from various cultural perspectives and attempts 
to arrive at some agreements on how these ethical 
problems are to be settled interculturally or cross-
culturally; therefore, it must employ both empirical 
findings of different cultural perspectives as well as 
normative analysis to determine what can, and should, be 
agreed upon. Once the agreements are reached, an 
adequate framework should also enable us to criticize and 
condemn those who fail to comply with the standard as 
specified. For any proper framework of IIE, therefore, it 
must have rooms for both descriptive analysis and 
normative analysis. 
 
I have explained that any adequate framework for IIE 
must be normative, in the sense that it should allow us to 
criticize or condemn others morally when a party fails to 
follows the shared, (quasi-) universal responses; however, 
criticisms or condemnations are only possible, if we can 
reject (or, at least, restrict) metaethical moral relativism – 
the view that the truth or falsity of moral judgments, or 
their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is 
relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a 
group of persons. For, if metaethical moral relativism is 
true, then it does not make any sense to criticize or 
condemn people from different cultures because their 
judgements, actions, etc. are based on different moral 
systems which is equally legitimate; indeed, if 
metaethical moral relativism is true, there seems to be no 
point of making any agreements at all, they are just 
unnecessary. While it is clear that any adequate 
framework in IIE has to resist metaethical moral 
relativism, it is also important to remind ourselves of the 
importance to avoid ethical imperialism that is – to 
impose one’s moral system onto another culture, or 
simply puts, to require peoples from other cultures to 
judge or act according their own norms and values. 
“SHARED NORMS, DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS” 
AS THE AIM OF IIE 
It should be clear by now that Ess’s formulation of the 
aim of IIE can be understood as both an attempt to avoid 
cultural-ethical imperialism (e.g. see (b)), and metaethical 
moral relativism, (e.g. see (c)). On a more concrete level, 
then, the aim of IIE as formulated is to provide shared 
norms for different societies with different cultures and 
distinct moral systems; and, at the same time, maintain 
the cultural diversity and respect the distinctiveness of 
various moral systems. The formulation by Ess, however, 
is not unambiguous. Particularly, it is unclear exactly 
what counts as maintaining cultural diversity and 
respecting different moral systems, e.g. (b), and when the 
norms are considered to be shared. If one looks at the 
theoretical foundations of recent debates and discussions 
of IIE (for summary, see Capurro 2008; Ess 2006, 2007a, 
2007b, 2008; Ess & Hongladarom 2007), one may 
discern two prevailing understandings of the aim of IIE, 
namely “shared norms, different interpretations” and 
“shared norms, different justifications”. As I will 
elaborate, the first understanding holds that there can be 
shared norms between different cultures, but different 
cultures can interpret the meaning of these norms 
differently with respect to their own moral systems. Here, 
maintaining cultural diversity and respecting other moral 
systems amount to pluralism in the interpretation of 
norms; on the second understanding, cultural diversity is 
maintained and other moral systems are respected 
through a plurality of justifications of norms, which 
means that different cultures should share a set of norms, 
but justifications of these norms may be different. 
 
In a series of paper, Ess (Ess 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) 
has developed and defended a theoretical foundation for 
IIE which he calls pros hen pluralism; while different 
interpretations of Ess’s theory can place it either as the 
“shared norms, different interpretations” approach or the 
“shared norms, different justifications” approach; 
nevertheless, the first interpretation of Ess’s theory 
provides the best example of how a “shared norms, 
different interpretations” approach would look like. In 
remaining of this section, I shall elaborate such 
interpretation of Ess’s theory and to show that it does not 
satisfy the agendas of IIE, and hence is untenable as the 
aim of IIE. 
 
Ess’s pros hen pluralism is based on Aristotle’s account 
of pros hen equivocals as well as the idea of phronesis, 
i.e. Aristotle’s notion of practical judgment. According to 
the pros hen pluralism, it is possible for the shared norms 
to take different but related meanings, as he puts (Ess 
2007a, 13) 
 
[Pros hen] equivocals stand as linguistic middle 
grounds between a homogenous univocation 
(which requires that a term have one and only one 
meaning) and a pure equivocation (as a single term 
may have multiple but entirely unrelated 
meanings…). Pros hen or focal equivocals, by 
contrast, are terms with clearly different meanings 
that simultaneously relate or cohere with one 
another as both point towards a shared or focal 
notion that anchors the meaning of each. 
 
And, it is up to different cultures to exercise their 
pragmatic judgment to determine their responses to the 
ICTs-related ethical problems; as Ess emphasizes the role 
of phronesis in his theory (Ess 2007a, 14) 
  
[P]hronesis allows us to take a general principle 
(as the ethical analogue to the focal term ground 
two pros hen equivocals) and discern how it may be 
interpreted or applied in different ways in different 
contexts (as the ethical analogues to the two pros 
hen equivocals – i.e., that are irreducibly different 
and yet inextricably connected). 
 
Taking the pros hen pluralism at its face value, what it 
appears to suggest is that the shared norms should be 
construed in the pros hen manner, i.e. the meaning of the 
shared norms is flexible and it remains so until it is being 
used to respond to ICTs-related ethical problems; then, 
the norms takes on a more concrete meaning supplied by 
the culture(s) involved. In fact, Ess thinks that different 
cultures are crucial in determining the meaning of the 
norms, as different culture can be complimentary to the 
others. In this way, various cultures are irreducibly 
different, but they can complement the other in 
determining the meaning of the norms. 
 
In defending the pros hen pluralism, Ess draws support 
from both researches in information ethics and 
comparative ethics; and his examples range from Bernd 
Carsten Stahl's notion of responsibility (and its 
applications in management of information systems), 
Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR)'s ethical 
guidelines for online research, comparative studies of 
Virtue Ethics/Ethics of Care and Confucian ethics to the 
notions of privacy in China and Hong Kong and many 
more. In these example, Ess tries to demonstrate how 
different parties, while sharing the same set of norms, 
they can nevertheless understand the norms differently. 
 
Ess's defence is lucid and admirable, but as Capurro 
(Capurro 2008) quickly points out, it is unclear how pros 
hen pluralism may resolve the tension created by the 
irreducibility of various cultural perspectives and their 
complementariness; indeed, it is unclear the different 
interpretations itself can help strengthen the shared 
norms; perhaps, more importantly, allowing different 
interpretations of norms is too unconstrained to avoid 
metaethical moral relativism. While Ess's own pros hen 
pluralism allows “the interpretation of a single idea 
themselves remain irreducibly different from another, but 
connected and coherent with one another by way of their 
shared point of origin and reference” (Ess 2006, 218), it 
seems to follow that a shared norm can be interpreted, 
and thus, implemented differently, as long as there is a 
“shared point of origin and reference”. Yet, without 
clearly identifying what is a legitimate “shared point of 
origin of reference”; any contingent facts may be 
employed to justify vastly contradictory interpretations, 
as well as conflicting implementations of a norm; and 
hence, pushing IIE towards metaethical moral relativism. 
“SHARED NORMS, DIFFERENT JUSTIFICATIONS” AS 
THE AIM OF IIE  
While being too unconstrained, the “shared norms, 
different interpretations” approach cannot avoid 
metaethical moral relativism; one may still insist on the 
necessity of shared norms, and turn to focus on different 
justifications of the same set of norms. In other words, 
one may stress on a more definite meaning of a norms, 
e.g. protection of privacy has a more or less fixed 
meaning; but, at the same time, distinct justifications for 
the norms can be derived from different cultural 
perspectives. For example, Hongladarom has argued that 
Buddhism also agrees with the protection of an 
individual's privacy; but the justification of it differs from 
the Western autonomy-based reasoning; in Buddhism, 
protection of privacy is not considered to be a protection 
of the individual's rights per se, rather it is considered to 
be a measure against human evil, such as greed for 
power, material gains, etc. (Hongladarom 2007). Such 
approach, therefore, aims to arrive at shared norms with 
different justifications (from various cultural perspective). 
I shall call this understanding of the aim of IIE as “shared 
norms, different justifications”. 
 
Here, given a standard of reasonableness, understanding 
plurality in terms of diverse justifications from different 
cultural perspectives seems to avoid relativism. However, 
two forms of reasonable justification, that is – ethical 
justification and pragmatic justification – have to be 
distinguished. Ethical justifications are based on the 
moral values within a particular moral system; as such, a 
moral system can ethically justify a norm if it has the 
relevant (set of) moral values; on the other hand, there is 
pragmatic justification, which “are (as far as possible) 
detached from any socio-political or philosophical 
presuppositions” (Soraker 2006, 123). Yet, neither forms 
of justification, as I will show, help the “shared norms, 
different justifications” approach to satisfy the basic 
requirements of IIE. 
 
 I believe a commonsensical concern for the using ethical 
justifications by the “shared norms, different 
justifications” approach is that: a particular culture simply 
does not have the resources to justify the norms, as it 
lacks the concepts at stake. For example, Brey has 
demonstrated that concepts such as privacy, intellectual 
property rights and freedom of information are missing 
from the Chinese, Japanese and Thai culture (Brey 
2007a); and, Burk goes beyond by  arguing that ethical 
justifications for intellectual property rights and 
individual privacy rights appear to be missing in 
Confucian heritage (Burk 2007). The commonsensical 
concern, however, conflates the moral concepts related to 
ICTs with the more fundamental values in which these 
concepts are based upon. In other words, the fact that a 
particular culture does not, currently, have concepts like 
privacy, intellectual property rights, and freedom to 
information does not by itself entails the culture does not 
have the resources to justify them; moreover, to claim 
that a particular culture does not have any resource to 
justify these concepts seems to appeal to a very simplistic 
picture of different cultural perspectives, and thus misses 
their complexity. 
 
The true worry for ethical justification, I believe, 
precisely stemmed from the complexity of various 
cultural perspectives. Indeed, if we consider the ethical 
debates in Western tradition, it is rather typical that a 
norm can be justified by a utilitarian-based ethics, while 
the negation of the very same norm can be justified by a 
deontological ethics. The very same thing can also be 
said of Confucian ethics, as it is often forgotten that 
Confucianism is not simply fixed rules derived from the 
canons; but, it is itself a school of thought that contains 
various sub-traditions, e.g. Neo-Confucianism, New 
Confucianism, etc.; and, the problem of complexity 
multiplies once we consider Chinese culture as a whole, 
which is constituted by Confucian, Daoist and Zen, and 
each has their own moral systems. Given the complexity 
of any cultural perspective, we can expect that a norm can 
be justified by the moral values embedded in the culture, 
while, at the same time, it can be rejected by the very 
same culture with different moral values (or, same values, 
but different interpretations of those moral values). The 
problem for “shared norms, different (ethical) 
justifications” therefore is one that: when different ethical 
justifications are equally legitimate, and these ethical 
justifications can justify the norms and their falsity; it is 
logically possible that no norm can ever be shared. In 
other words, it renders this approach logically 
inconsistent at its worse. 
 
Hence, without an overarching position, the “shared 
norms, different (ethical) justifications” is not going to 
work. Perhaps, then we should look elsewhere to justify 
the shared norms; as I have pointed out, other than ethical 
justifications, there also pragmatic justifications (e.g. 
Soraker 2006), which may help to bring 'overlapping 
consensus' by highlighting the pragmatic benefits of 
maintaining the shared norms; indeed, as Ess's and 
Soraker's examples, e.g. emerging notions of privacy in 
China and Hong Kong (Ess 2008) and China's regulations 
and surveillance of the Internet (Soraker 2006), forcefully 
demonstrate pragmatic arguments (and thus, pragmatic 
justifications) appear to be most effective way to justify 
the norms. However, pragmatic justifications are ill-
suited for IIE in two senses: firstly, it risks transforming 
ethical problems into non-ethical problems by 
substituting ethical justifications with pragmatic 
justifications; secondly, it seems to downplay the role of 
the moral systems in different cultural perspectives in IIE, 
when these moral systems should be at the core of IIE. 
 
First, consider the force of pragmatic justifications in 
promoting or defending the shared norms; it is their being 
abstracted away from a particular cultural perspective, by 
turning the emphasis on favourable and unfavourable, 
that makes agreements by different cultures more easily. 
Hence, arguing along Soraker's line, China's regulations 
and surveillance of the Internet is problematic insofar as 
the consequence of it is unfavourable to the Chinese 
government; but, if China fail to response to the 
pragmatic justifications, it is only possible to accuse of 
her being pragmatically incompetent but not ethically 
wrong. In other words, the shift towards pragmatic 
justifications also signifies the shift away from making 
moral evaluations. An approach like this will thereby fail 
to satisfy the basic requirement for an adequate 
framework of IIE, i.e. that the framework should be 
normative. 
 
Also, the shift towards pragmatic justifications also 
signifies a move away from any cultural perspectives; 
thus, rather than promoting cultural diversity and 
respecting different moral systems, pragmatic 
justifications throw away the “intercultural” project of 
IIE, and therefore, it is ill-suited for IIE. 
 
Perhaps, the worse problem for grounding pragmatic 
justifications a significant role in IIE is its essential link 
to the economic considerations; there are, in fact, two 
arguments for rejecting pragmatic justifications in IIE: 
theoretically, it is, as I have tried to show, contradictory 
to the basic tenet of IIE, that is – to maintain cultural 
diversity and to respect different moral systems; one may 
even go further to argue that the use of pragmatic 
justifications itself is one form of imperialism; and, 
practically, it is likely to be an unequal tools of 
negotiations.  
 
The use of pragmatic justifications can be construed as a 
form of imperialism, because it presupposes economic 
progress (or, at least some form of progress) to be the 
most basic value; however, the concept of economic 
progress is not neutral for different cultural perspective; 
by putting it at the core of IIE, then, run afoul of the 
original intention of IIE. Secondly, because of the 
pretended neutrality of economic progress for diverge 
cultures, they may be used to mask any attempt to 
dominate other cultures in the name of supposed 
economic progress. By pushing pragmatic justifications 
in such terms, and by allowing our sources for 
evaluations in economic terms, it essentially transformed 
the ethical issues into political struggles, in which various 
agendas can be coined in the spirit of promoting progress. 
 
In sum, the justifications in “the shared norms, different 
justifications” ought not to be pragmatic, as the use of 
pragmatic justifications runs against the nature of IIE. 
Yet, I have also argued that ethical justifications are not a 
suitable candidate for such approach once we realize the 
complexity of different cultures; and, with no overarching 
position to judge which justifications are more legitimate, 
the prospect of shared norms is dim. 
WHAT SHOULD WE SHARE? 
In the previous sections, I have tried to show both 
understandings of the aim of IIE are problematic. I 
believe the problem arise from an overemphasis on 
producing shared norms. While I agree that having a 
shared (set of) norms is of practical importance, (a set of) 
well defined rules can help to resolve disputed ICTs-
related ethical issues, particularly, in the (quasi-) legal 
sense, e.g. international laws, professional code of ethics, 
etc., but the emphasis on what rules can and should be 
shared and how to implement these rules lead to an 
oversight of the philosophical-theoretical foundation of 
IIE.  
 
Already demonstrated in my discussion of the two 
understandings of the aim of IIE as producing shared 
norms, the resulting norms have to be either 'open' or 
'thin', i.e. either it is open to different meanings or it has 
no substantial normative content at all; in this sense, it is 
possible to see the aim of IIE, for the shared norms 
approaches, is to produce a minimal moral denominator, 
that is – to specify the basic norms in ICTs-related ethical 
issues that can be accepted by all cultural perspectives. 
As I have shown, without an overarching position to 
arbitrate between different interpretations and/or various 
justifications, such minimal moral denominator is too 
weak to issue normative or evaluative judgments. As a 
normative project, the shared norms approaches falsely 
based its normative foundation on minimal moral 
denominator. While I agree with Himma that an objective 
moral foundation is necessary for the normative project 
of IIE (Himma 2007), the question remains: what, if not 
shared norms, can provide the objective moral foundation 
for IIE. The answer, I believe, is (a set of) shared values. 
 
My call for a shift towards values is not entirely new (for 
examples, Brey 2007b, Bynum 2006; Floridi 2007; 
Johnstone 2007), and what distinguishes the values-based 
approaches from the norms-based approaches is their 
attempts to identify (a set of) basic, common values 
which is valid across various cultures; it remains an open 
question as to what the (set of) basic, common values 
may look like, it may take the form of human (and non-
human) flourishing (Bynum 2006), being (Floridi 2007) 
or capabilities (Johnstone 2007); but, what is important 
for the values-based approaches is that: such (set of) 
basic, common values are defined normatively, and that 
we have the moral responsibility to maintain and promote 
these values. As such, it provides a normative foundation 
for arbitrating ethical issues, based on the shared values. 
But, how will the values-talk translate to ICTs-related 
ethical issues in IIE? For one thing, ICTs-related ethical 
issues often claim to arise from cultures possessing 
different values, e.g. privacy issues in East-West context 
are often construed as a stand-off between community-
based values and individualistic values; the shared values 
approaches will urge for a close investigation of the 
scenario and the values involved, and to determine if it is 
true that no shared value is available; and, it is 
particularly important for the values-based approaches 
not to overlook complexity of different cultural 
perspectives, in its retrieval of moral resource. 
 
More time and efforts have to be given to fully develop a 
values-based IIE; here, it is important to note that the aim 
of IIE is not to eliminate every moral disagreements in 
ICTs-related ethical issues; as moral disagreement 
appears to be an ineliminable feature of our practical 
reality; but, at least, IIE should allow us to legitimately 
formulate normative and evaluate judgements for these 
issues. To do so, IIE must have a proper moral 
foundation; I have tried to show that the use of “shared 
norms” fails to provide such foundation; and hence, 
“shared values” appears to be a more promising candidate 
for the task. Moreover, as Johnstone (Johnstone 2007) 
has pointed out, attending to values opens up the space 
for issues which are marginal in the norms-based debates, 
e.g. well-being, digital divide, and gender issues. In other 
words, an added advantage of values-based IIE would be 
a more encompassing project than the one in norms-based 
IIE. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have examined two understandings of the 
aim of IIE, they are respectively, “shared norms, different 
interpretations” and “shared norms, different 
justifications”. Both approaches aim at establishing 
shared norms that would be accepted by different 
cultures. I have tried to show that neither of them provide 
proper basis for IIE as a normative project. While I have 
not prove, in this paper, “shared values” is the ultimate 
aim for IIE; my modest objective is to demonstrate the 
problems and weakness of the approaches which focus 
primarily on establishing shared norms; and hence, to 
 open up the space of discussion for values-based 
approaches for IIE.  
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